Posted: December 30th, 2024

Employment Law Case Brief and Presentation, law homework help

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Use the IRAC method to write a case brief on Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.2 slides; 1 for the intro of the presentation and 1 for the "c" in IRAC which is the conclusion.I need detailed notes for the slides. I will attach the template that I need the slides added to.Employment Law Case - Team C.pptx Please cite any references and add to reference slide.THOMPSON v. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS, LP562 U.S. __ (2011)After petitioner Thompson’s fiancée, Miriam Regalado,filed a sex discrimination charge with the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)against their employer, respondent North AmericanStainless (NAS), NAS fired Thompson. He filed hisown charge and a subsequent suit under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act, claiming that NAS fired him toretaliate against Regalado for filing her charge. TheDistrict Court granted NAS summary judgment onthe ground that third-party retaliation claims were notpermitted by Title VII, which prohibits discriminationagainst an employee “because he has made a [Title VII]charge.” The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoningthat Thompson was not entitled to sue NAS forretaliation because he had not engaged in any activityprotected by the statute. By a vote of 8-0, the SupremeCourt overturned the Court of Appeals. (Justice Kagantook no part in the consideration of the case.)SCALIA, J.: Until 2003, both petitioner EricThompson and his fiancée, Miriam Regalado, wereemployees of respondent North American Stainless(NAS). In February 2003, the Equal EmploymentOpportunity Commission (EEOC) notified NAS thatRegalado had filed a charge alleging sex discrimination.Three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson.Thompson then filed a charge with the EEOC.After conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, he suedNAS in the United States District Court for the EasternDistrict of Kentucky under Title VII of the Civil RightsAct of 1964,78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq.,claiming that NAS had fired him in order to retaliateagainst Regalado for filing her charge with the EEOC.The District Court granted summary judgment to NAS,concluding that Title VII “does not permit third partyretaliation claims.” 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (ED Ky.2006). After a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed theDistrict Court, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing enbanc and affirmed by a 10-to-6 vote. 567 F. 3d 804(2009). The court reasoned that because Thompson didnot “engag[e] in any statutorily protected activity, eitheron his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado,”he “is not included in the class of persons for whomCongress created a retaliation cause of action.” . . .Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawfulemployment practice for an employer to discriminateagainst any of his employees . . . because he has madea charge” under Title VII. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a). Thestatute permits “a person claiming to be aggrieved” tofile a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employercommitted an unlawful employment practice, and, ifthe EEOC declines to sue the employer, it permits acivil action to “be brought . . . by the person claimingto be aggrieved . . . by the alleged unlawful employmentpractice.” §2000e–5(b), (f)(1). It is undisputedthat Regalado’s filing of a charge with the EEOC wasprotected conduct under Title VII. In the proceduralposture of this case, we are also required to assumethat NAS fired Thompson in order to retaliate againstRegalado for filing a charge of discrimination. Thiscase therefore presents two questions: First, did NAS’sfiring of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation?And second, if it did, does Title VII grant Thompsona cause of action?With regard to the first question, we have little difficultyconcluding that if the facts alleged by Thompsonare true, then NAS’s firing of Thompson violated TitleVII. In Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53(2006), we held that Title VII’s antiretaliation provisionmust be construed to cover a broad range of employerconduct. We reached that conclusion by contrastingthe text of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision with itssubstantive antidiscrimination provision. . . . Title VII’santiretaliation provision prohibits any employer actionthat “well might have dissuaded a reasonable workerfrom making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”Id., at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).We think it obvious that a reasonable worker mightbe dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if sheknew that her fiancé would be fired. Indeed, NAS doesnot dispute that Thompson’s firing meets the standardset forth in Burlington. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. NAS raisesthe concern, however, that prohibiting reprisals againstthird parties will lead to difficult line-drawing problemsconcerning the types of relationships entitled to protection.Perhaps retaliating against an employee by firinghis fiancée would dissuade the employee from engagingin protected activity, but what about firing an employee’sgirlfriend, close friend, or trusted co-worker? . . .Although we acknowledge the force of this point,we do not think it justifies a categorical rule that thirdpartyreprisals do not violate Title VII. As explainedabove, we adopted a broad standard in Burlingtonbecause Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is wordedbroadly. We think there is no textual basis for makingan exception to it for third-party reprisals, anda preference for clear rules cannot justify departingfrom statutory text. We must also decline to identifya fixed class of relationships for which third-partyreprisals are unlawful. We expect that firing a closefamily member will almost always meet the Burlingtonstandard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mereacquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond thatwe are reluctant to generalize. . . .The more difficult question in this case is whetherThompson may sue NAS for its alleged violation ofTitle VII. The statute provides that “a civil action maybe brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”“. . . to be aggrieved” to bring “a civil action.” It is arguablethat the aggrievement referred to is nothing morethan the minimal Article III standing, which consistsof injury in fact caused by the defendant and remediableby the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). But Thompson’s claimundoubtedly meets those requirements, so if that isindeed all that aggrievement consists of, he may sue. . . .We hold that the term “aggrieved” in Title VIIincorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff withan interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by thestatutes,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat.Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 495 (1998) (internalquotation marks omitted), while excluding plaintiffswho might technically be injured in an Article III sensebut whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitionsin Title VII. Applying that test here, we concludethat Thompson falls within the zone of interestsprotected by Title VII. Thompson was an employee ofNAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employeesfrom their employers’ unlawful actions. Moreover,accepting the facts as alleged, Thompson is not anaccidental victim of the retaliation—collateral damage,so to speak, of the employer’s unlawful act. To the contrary,injuring him was the employer’s intended meansof harming Regalado. Hurting him was the unlawfulact by which the employer punished her. In those circumstances,we think Thompson well within the zoneof interests sought to be protected by Title VII. He is aperson aggrieved with standing to sue.employment_law_case___team_c.pptx

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